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Abstract
  This Paper lines up the important issues which a foreign business or its 
attorney need to note when engaging in M&A with Chinese companies. In the 
context of either share or asset acquisition, China is bringing its rules more in line 
with the international standards. Nevertheless, certain specific points deserve attention 
and should not be taken for granted, while many others are still undergoing 
evolution. Some most recent development such as VIE is also reviewed.
Keywords: investment in China, securities regulation, merger and acquisition, 
foreign invested enterprise, takeover of listed companies, variable 
interest entity, anti-monopoly review
I. Introduction
There is no doubt that the role China is going to play in the near future at in-
ternational level is going to grow in importance, and its influence on the rest of 
the world will become more evident. Not only its economic and financial power 
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are having an impact on the markets all around the world, but also the wise lead-
ership is developing a modern, harmonious and high income society (as described 
by the World Bank)1) which will help the government in maintaining its power 
granting to a population of more than 1.3 billion people a better standard of life, 
contributing at the same time to reanimating and revitalizing the global economy.  
In this globalized world China is becoming every day more integrated and an un-
changeable player who will be of paramount importance also for the success of a 
“green sustainable development.” All these expectations are reflected in the 12
th 
Five Year Plan, with its focus on quality of growth. Naturally, this improved 
“quality” in investments will be replicated with regard to cross-border operations, 
and will not only interest the local market.  
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), and Takeovers are the new forms of invest-
ment foreign investors are considering to enter China, but they are also the same 
instruments Chinese business people are using to expand their influence abroad.
This paper, however, will examine the characteristics of the Chinese legal envi-
ronment only, because the object and the purpose are to highlight opportunities in 
China for foreign investors. Investing in China is not only vital for those busi-
nesses that in this moment are struggling to survive, but this also, should contrib-
ute to fostering new initiatives in China to allocate the new foreign resources ar-
riving in China. Even though complicated, it has clearly emerged that M&A and 
Takeovers are the most effective and efficient ways to currently enter the Chinese 
market. 
II. Prospective of New Forms of Investment in China
China is one of the world’s leading economic powers today, and confidence in 
the world’s second-largest economy is still mounting as we can witness from the 
1) Report by the World Bank: “China 2030 – Building a Modern, Harmonious, and 
Creative High-Income Society,” 2012, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/International Development Association of The World Bank.
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ever increasing foreign direct investments (FDI). It is foreseeably predicted that 
China will soon become the new frontier of capital investments. In fact, recently 
China is bolstering the strength of its capital market in a move to encourage M&A 
activities, in addition to the restructuring of listed companies. One of its financial 
center, Shanghai, now ranks as the sixth most competitive financial center world-
wide and its importance is expected to grow in the near future.
It is a matter of fact that Chinese deal activity in this sector, namely “M&A”, 
both inbound and outbound, has been a key driver of the global M&A rebound in 
2010 and 2011. Analysts said that domestic strategic M&A activity is expected to 
increase in industries previously only accessible to State-owned enterprise. Meanwhile 
foreign investors are expected to re-enter the market at volumes last seen before 
the financial crisis. 
It is also worth stressing that Shanghai is making moves to enhance its mergers 
and acquisitions market with the aim to make itself a global financial hub by 
2020 (an ambition which was approved by the state Council in March 2009). Just 
to confirm the importance China is giving to its financial markets it is worth re-
porting that the Shanghai Stock Exchange will implement "round-the-clock trad-
ing" by 2020. No Stock Exchange in the world has yet implemented 24-hour 
trading. Furthermore, the local government is considering setting up a China 
Mergers and Acquisitions Association in Shanghai, and according to figures from 
the Shanghai headquarters of the People’s Bank of China, there are 11 financial 
institutions running M&A loan business in the city. This represents another con-
firmation of the trend which at present China is experiencing.
Chinese authorities are accelerating the process to allow overseas companies to 
float shares in the domestic A-share markets as a way to ease and facilitate in-
flows of new investments and to give Chinese investors new room to allocate 
their money. The “international board” was to be launched at the end of 2011, 
however it should fully functioning and operating in 2012, though the schedule is 
not fixed. However, it seems that the approval procedure for overseas companies 
seeking listing on the board will be made simpler and faster than that for domes-
tic companies. The central bank hopes the international board will be launched 
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and be operative as soon as possible, adding the market and industry demand for 
the board is real. The securities regulator affirmed that overseas companies could 
list on the new board through initial public offers (IPO)2) or depositary receipts 
2) The China Securities Regulatory Commission introduced the IPO sponsor system in 
2004: under the system, Chinese companies seeking an IPO on Shanghai or Shenzhen 
exchange are required to obtain the endorsement of a qualified sponsor. The sponsors 
are to complete a due diligence checklist and sign a declaration that they are aware of 
the legal consequences before they recommend an IPO candidate to the commission 
for approval. The sponsors are required to make sure financial data and other information 
provided in the IPO prospectus are truthful. Sponsors also continue to oversee 
disclosure information, to be sure it is valid, for one or two years (depending on the 
trading board) after the company floats its shares. The system is aimed at improving 
the quality of public companies and better protecting investors’ interest. Hua Sheng, 
president of Yanching University in Beijing, told a forum in Beijing in November that 
the main problem is the sponsor system’s mild punishment of wrongdoing by sponsors 
and their representatives. Regulations issued by the securities commission stipulate that 
if a public company’s earnings decline more than 50% in the year went public, or if 
there are any irregularities in information disclosure, the IPO sponsor will be banned 
for 3 to 12 months, and in serious cases, a sponsor’s business license can be revoked. 
Gaoxin Zhangtong Co. Ltd., a tube maker, was delisted last year (2010) after reporting 
a loss in three consecutive years after going public. The punishment given the two 
sponsor representatives with Bohai Securities Co. Ltd. was a “notice of criticism” from 
the commission. “The punishment should be much tougher”, Liu Jipeng, a professor at 
China University of Political Science and Law, wrote on his blog. “The situation now 
is that nobody is to be blamed if there are problems. The sponsors are actually 
committing fraud at no risk”. Hong Kong also has an IPO sponsor system but is 
much tougher when it punishes wrongdoing. Sponsors face huge fines and possible 
criminal charges if their transgressions are caught: e.g. Hong Kong Economic Times 
reported in September 2011 that Mega Capital (Asia) Co. Ltd. faces fines of up to 
HK$ 100 million ($ 12.85 million) after making inaccurate statements in the prospectus 
of Hontex International Holdings Co. Ltd. Even in Hong Kong, where the sponsor 
system dates to 1999, there are flaws. Late last month (November 2011), the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority said it found inadequacies in the activities of five banks 
that sponsor IPOs in the city, including their handling of the due diligence and 
disclosures in IPO prospectuses. However, the sponsor system is only a temporary 
method adopted on the way to China’s IPO mechanism reform. China’s stock issuing 
should soon go from administrative examination and approval to registration. Under the 
registration system, which is used in the United States, regulators check only the format 
of a company’s information disclosure. Investors decide which companies will survive, 
and they correct wrongdoing through legal action. In the US if a company makes 
false statements in its prospectus, investors will make it pay a huge price through 
class actions. Following the rise of its IPO market in recent years, development of 
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traded in Chinese stock exchanges. The China Regulatory Securities Commission 
(CSRC) is also exploring the possibility of overseas companies issuing yuan-de-
nominated bonds and other debt instruments. The launch of the international board 
is being widely watched because it could draw a string of multinational companies 
to the mainland fundraising pool. 
Furthermore, a “pilot program” to allow HK investors to buy mainland stocks 
with RMB was lunched in the middle of December 2011 in order to allow over-
seas investors to use off-shore RMB deposits to invest in the mainland’s capital 
markets. Experts said the deregulation will increase the popularity of the currency 
and expedite its internationalization. The initial quota of the program, known as 
the RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor, is 20 billion yuan (about $ 3.1. 
billion), according to the China Securities Regulatory Commission. According to 
the regulator, 80% of the quota will be allowed to invest in the mainland’s 
fixed-income markets such as government and corporate bonds while only 20% 
will be allowed to enter stock markets. This move seems to be part of Beijing’s 
ambition to raise the global profile of the local currency to reduce reliance on the 
US dollar in cross-border transactions. 
It is a matter of fact, according to the data gathered by the CSRC, that main-
land China is going to maintain IPO lead. Despite the weakening in new offerings 
in the second half of 2011 China will continue to lead the global IPO market 
next year, this is also the sentiment of the accounting firm Ernest & Young LLP 
(E&Y) as stated in an article published in the China Daily.3) The Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange was the world’s most active IPO market in 2011, ranking first in the 
number of issues and second in the amount of capital raised in the first 11 
months of 2011. Edward Ho, managing partner of assurance services at E&Y de-
clared that “the IPO pipeline of Chinese issuers remain healthy and we expect the 
total amount of capital raised in the first half of next year to be at least 300 bil-
China’s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market also has picked up. As a result, the 
securities commission is introducing a financial adviser system, a counterpart to the 
IPO sponsor system.
3) Mainland to maintain IPO lead, China Daily, December 22, 2011.
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lion yuan”(about $48 billion). 
The Shenzhen exchange, including the small and medium-sized enterprise board 
and the start-up board ChiNext, raised 181 billion yuanin 243 deals in 2011 ac-
cording E&Y. Though the global IPO activity has declined significantly since 
mid-2011 due to market concerns about the Eurozone debt crisis and the down-
grade of the US sovereign debt rating Mr. Edward Ho remains optimistic about 
next year’s IPO situation, with increasing liquidity in the markets as China gradu-
ally loosens monetary policy to support growth. Furthermore, he added that “a 
speedy resolution of Europe’s debt crisis would help stabilize global markets and 
restore investor confidence”. 
It seems that other opportunities are emerging for foreign companies wishing to 
invest in China, especially related to the protection environment. While technology 
and innovation in general is central to China’s development in the future, some 
specific words should be given to opportunities regarding ‘green technology’ in 
China. In recent years China has poured a lot of money and resources into devel-
opment of ‘green technology’ and this is not without reason. A recent report from 
the World Bank, released in March of 2012, estimates that the cost of environ-
mental degradation and depletion of resources has caused China nearly 10% of its 
GDP over the last decade. While this is of great concern for China it is also a 
chance to drive China’s economy forward through investment and implementation 
of ‘green technology’. In particular, foreign companies that have developed green 
technology or patents related to green technology could easily see an increase in 
their business activities if they are willing to get involved in China. Regardless of 
the exact method used, there is no doubt that in the near future foreign companies 
that have coveted technology will be at an advantage in regards to any M&A ac-
tivities they wish to engage in China. Therefore, such companies should actively 
investigate the most advantageous way to use their technological advantage to gain 
a presence or larger presence in China. 
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III. Consolidation and Restructuring of Businesses and a New 
Reform to Improve the Securities Markets
While China has gone through considerable restructuring of its SOEs since its 
reform and opening policy there is still work to be done. One clear decision of the 
12
th
 Five Year Plan is that China should continue to consolidate fragmented busi-
ness sectors and restructure SOEs. One of the major reasons why restructuring 
will continued to be encouraged in one form or another is that various reports 
(including the World Bank’s China 2030 report) show that from China’s reform in 
the late 1970’s till recently SOEs are 1/3 as efficient as private enterprises. 
In regards to SOEs the State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Council 
(SASAC) has already decided and implemented plans to reduce the number of 
SOEs to 80 by 2020 (down from 120 in 2010). Most SOEs tend to have large and 
complex organizational structures with many business units. While this might be 
overwhelming it also offers many M&A opportunities if foreign investors can 
work on reorganizing and splitting these various business units into M&A targets. 
With nearly 40 SOEs planned to be dismantled in the coming years, opportunities 
abound for those are savvy in their negotiation process. 
Furthermore, China is pushing for wider based consolidations both publicly and 
privately in a number of sectors in order to create large corporate entities that 
will help to make industrial development more efficient. The main drive in this 
effort was to restructure six key industries including automobiles, steel, cement, 
machinery, rare earths and aluminum. In the summer of 2011 three more industries 
were added to this list including manufacturing, IT and medical supplies and 
equipment. While foreign companies and capital are welcomed to aid in the process 
of consolidating these industries it must be understood that the majority of the 
transactions will be instigated by Chinese firms that are looking to consolidate 
within China or expand outside China. Still opportunities abound particularly in 
Shanghai where the local government is putting in place policies to financially aid 
M&A transactions that will come from the restructuring of the industries mentioned 
above. As quoted by the China Daily, Shanghai’s Vice-Mayor Tu Guangshao said, 
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“The city will initially actively propel the construction of its financial market and 
M&A-related auxiliary services, especially the agents who facilitate deals, to aid 
these activities.” Companies seeking to list on Shanghai’s so-called “international board” 
should achieve market capitalization of more than 30 billion yuan (about €3 bil-
lion) and have a combined three year net income of more than 3 billion yuan.
In a move to set up sound, fair market for investors, top securities regulator 
could introduce delisting procedures for the main board by mid-year in 2012 to 
insure fair market in which investors’ interests are protected. “A delisting system, 
which can improve market efficiency, should be launched on the foundation of an 
investor protection system”, expressed Guo Shuqing, chairman of the China Securities 
Commission (CSRC) and a deputy of the National People’s Congress (NPC), as 
reported by the China Daily on Tuesday, March 6, 2012. Substantially, delisting 
procedures allow stock exchanges to suspend and cancel share trades for compa-
nies that have been in red for a certain period of time.4) The absence of a delist-
ing procedure has prompted speculation in unprofitable public companies, increas-
ing overall market volatility.
When China joined the WTO a decade ago it opened up many of its sectors for 
the first time and one of these is the “securities market”. According to the prom-
ises made in 2001, offices of foreign securities firms in China were allowed to 
become special members of the Chinese securities stock exchanges and to set up 
joint ventures to operate securities investment and fund management with a max-
imum stake holding of 33%.5) Ten years after China’s admission to the WTO, 
there are only 12 joint venture securities firms operating in Chinese mainland 
(those include China International Capital Co. Ltd., the first jointly funded invest-
ment bank in China). This liberalization made China a world investment destina-
4) The Shanzhen Stock Exchange released a draft delisting procedure for the growth 
enterprise market on November 29, 2011. That procedure allows for delisting if the 
daily closing price drops below book value for 20 consecutive trading days.
5) Three years later (2004), foreign stake holding in a Chinese financial institution were 
allowed to reach 49%. By the end of 2006, the establishment of six joint venture 
securities firms and 24 fund management companies had been approved, and foreign 
held shares had reached 49 % in 11 fund management companies.
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tion and Shanghai was one of the cities that benefited most from that trend. As 
China’s financial hub, Shanghai has seen its financial sector developing very fast, 
so does Hong Kong.6) However, the expansion of foreign investment institutions 
in China remains slow and joint-venture securities firms are still struggling to gain 
clients. While foreign investment institutions have taken part in facilitating Chinese 
companies selling shares in Hong Kong or foreign markets, their business in the 
domestic A share market was not so significant according to “Wind Info”, a 
Shanghai based integrated service provider of financial data (Dec. 2011). 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission introduced rules in June 2002, 
which set the maximum foreign stake in a Chinese brokerage at 33% as mentioned 
above. Following this move, UBS, Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse and Deutsche 
Bank each formed a Chinese JV with local securities firm by holding a minority 
stake.7) Despite the local market restrictions, foreign investment institutions are 
eager to expand their business in China, the world’s second largest economy with 
a capital market that raised about $72 billion in IPO deals in 2010, which exceeded 
that of Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges for the first time. 
The lunch of the international board in Shanghai will help provide more busi-
ness opportunities for joint ventures firms in Chinese A share market. The interna-
tional board will allow foreign companies to float shares on the Chinese stock 
markets. Just to illustrate how lucrative the Chinese market can be, the CITIC 
Securities Co. Ltd., the country’s largest brokerage by market value, earned 10.9 
billion yuan in net profit in 2010, even though the country’s stock market was 
among the worst performing in 2010. According to the China Securities Association 
6) The number of mainland companies that listed in Hong Kong in create to more than 
600 from around 90 in 2001, according to Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Ltd., 
the holding company for the stock exchange. 
7) Most joint venture Securities firms are formed by foreign investment banks and 
domestic small and medium sized Securities firms. It must be noted that the sharp 
differences in corporate culture and attitudes to operation and management between 
Chinese and foreign companies have turned the expected advantages of joint venture 
into disadvantages. For example, in 2007, a joint venture between domestic Changjiang 
Securities Co. Ltd. and BNP Parisbas Bank, has dissolved after three years due to 
differing opinions on its future and operation.
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the 106 securities brokerages together earned about 108.5 billion yuan in net income 
from the underwriting business in 2010.
IV. Concept of “M&A” and Content of the M&A Regulations 2006
By 2006 China revised and made its M&A laws more precise with its Provisions 
on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (more 
generally referred to as the M&A Regulations 2006).8) These new regulations al-
lowed more sophisticated ways to enter Chinese market, like share swaps, and 
showed China’s slow but steady progress in liberalizing its legal regime. In partic-
ular, the Chinese legislator has recently enacted and updated a new legal frame-
work regulating M&A transactions which seems to respond well to the needs of 
international investors, as to attract investments needed to sustain and foster the 
Chinese economy. Thanks to these more precise requirements and rules, it is eas-
ier than ever to invest in China.
Before we take a more in-depth look at these regulations it is necessary to un-
derstand how mergers and acquisitions are defined in China: 
The term “M&A” (binggou, 并购) refers generically to any combination of two 
or more business enterprises. 
➤ A merger (hebing or jianbing, 合并/兼并) is the legal combination of two discrete 
economic entities in which only one entity survives and assumes all the assets 
and liabilities of both entities.
➤ In contrast, an acquisition (shougou, 收购) can be defined as the purchase by 
8) The 2006 M&A Regulations, have been issued by six governmental agencies orchestrated 
by the Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM), and became effective on September 8, 
2006. These agencies include: Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM), China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), State Administration of Taxation (SAT), State Administration 
for Industry & Commerce (SAIC), State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) and State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE).
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one economic entity of all or part of the shares (i.e. equity interest) or as-
sets of another economic entity. 
However, it must be noted that under Chinese law there does not exist a con-
crete definition of “mergers and acquisitions”; a general definition is stated in the 
Company Law (art. 173):
“The merger of a company may be effected by way of merger or consolidation:
➤ In the case of merger (xishouhebing, 吸收合并), a company absorbs any oth-
er company and the absorbed company is dissolved; 
➤ In the case of consolidation (xinshehebing, 新设合并), two or more compa-
nies combine together for the establishment of a new one, and the existing 
ones are dissolved.”  
The Company Law in China underwent a substantial revision in 2005, with the 
goal of facilitating the incorporation of a company and capital raising, to better 
protect the interest of minority shareholders, and to improve the corporate governance. 
Among other things, the revised Company Law removed the restraints on out-
bound investments which could be made by a company in which the aggregate 
amount of outbound investments shall not exceed 50% of the net assets of the 
company,9) making it more likely for companies to become the object of M&A 
and mobilizing financial leverage of companies. At the same time, the revised 
Company Law streamlined generally the procedure of M&A, provided simplified 
solutions to dispose for existing claims and debts and improved the efficiency of 
M&A. It is interesting to note how the Chinese legislator has changed one of the 
provisions of the Company Law to facilitate these transactions: Art. 184 of the 
9) Art. 12 of the Company Law (2004 version) : “A company may invest in other 
limited liability companies or companies limited by shares and bear responsibility to 
such companies in which it has invested in proportion to the amount of investment it 
has made. Apart from investment companies and holding companies as specified by 
the State Council, where a company invests in other limited liability companies or 
companies limited by shares, the aggregate amount of the investment shall not exceed 
50% of the net assets of the company, without counting the portion gained from the 
capital increase caused by the invested company through converting its profit.”
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Company Law 2004 Version was formulated as follows: “The companies con-
cerned shall notify their creditors within ten days as of the date when the merger 
resolutions of the companies are taken and announce in the newspapers at least 
three times within 30 days. Creditors have the right to demand the companies to 
clear their debts or provide corresponding guarantees within 30 days after the no-
tifications received or within 90 days as of the date of the first announcement in 
cases in which notifications have not been received. Without clearing debts or 
providing guarantee, the merger may not be carried out ” this provision was re-
placed by art. 174 of the Company Law 2005 Revision: “The companies con-
cerned shall, within ten days as of making the decision of merger, notify the cred-
itors, and shall make a public announcement on a newspaper within 30 days. The 
creditors may, within 30 days as of the receipt of the notice or within 45 days as 
of the issuance of the public announcement if it fails to receive a notice, require 
the company to clear off its debts or to provide corresponding guarantees.” 
Meanwhile, art. 175 was added that mandated that when companies merge, the 
surviving company or the newly established company shall succeed to the claims 
and debts of each party to the merger.
However, the M&A Regulations 2006, in respect of the Company Law, give us 
a more precise definition of mergers and acquisitions, in fact art. 2 states that:
“mergers and acquisitions of a domestic enterprise by foreign investors shall 
mean”
➤ Purchase of an equity interest (goumaiguquan, 购买股权) from shareholders 
of a domestic enterprise (not a FIE);
➤ Subscribing to the increase in the registered capital (rengouzengzi, 认购增资) 
of a Domestic Enterprise; (the DE changes into a FIE);
Or
➤ Establishing a FIE which will acquire the assets (zichan, 资产) of a domes-
tic enterprise and operate such assets;
➤ Purchasing assets of a Domestic Enterprise and use such assets as invest-
ment to establish a FIE to operate such assets. Noteworthy the assets purchas-
ing agreement shall be governed by laws of China.10)
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In particular the purchase of an equity interest by foreign investors may be op-
erated directly or indirectly (either registered capital or shares) in a target com-
pany registered in China. In a direct equity acquisition, the foreign investor ac-
quires equity in a domestic enterprise or a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) from 
the existing Chinese or foreign equity holders pursuant to a share purchase agree-
ment or from the target through a subscription for new equity. In an indirect 
equity acquisition, if the Chinese target company is an existing FIE, a foreign in-
vestor may acquire or increase control of the Chinese target company through the 
offshore purchase of some or all of a foreign party’s interest in the FIE. Such a 
transaction is invariably conducted offshore in the jurisdiction of the FIE’s exist-
ing foreign investor and generally does not attract Chinese legal implications, ex-
cept in certain circumstances pursuant to the new antitrust review regime in 
China.
Not all provisions of the M&A Regulations 2006 apply to a M&A transaction 
for equity interest in an existing foreign-invested enterprise, but the Provisions for 
the Alteration of Investors’ Equity Interests in Foreign-invested Enterprises11) shall 
first apply to these transactions. According to such Provisions, a direct equity in-
terest acquisition/transfer in a foreign-invested enterprise requires the approval of 
the governmental authority for foreign investment which has originally approved 
the establishment of such foreign-invested enterprise. 
V. Evaluation of the Target Company
One major effect of the M&A Regulations 2006 is the valuation requirements 
for all types of eligible targets. It is worth noting that based on the Regulations, 
only Chinese domestic companies organized in the form of a limited liability com-
10) In this sense, art. 24, M&A Regulations 2006.
11) The provisions were promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce and entered into 
force on May 28, 1997.
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pany or a company limited by shares regulated by the PRC Company Law are di-
rectly qualified to be the targets of an equity interest M&A transaction involving 
foreign investment. Other entities such as wholly people-owned enterprise or col-
lective-owned enterprises are not properly structured and prepared to directly in-
troduce foreign investors in an equity interest acquisition. In fact, a number of do-
mestic enterprises are still organized today in the traditional forms and these en-
terprises may have no articles of association, no board of directors and even no 
concept of shares. Therefore, they must be restructured into limited liability com-
panies to prepare themselves to be introduced to foreign investors. However, there 
is no restriction for what type of target an asset transaction can accommodate. 
That is to say, a Chinese domestic enterprise which is not organized in the form 
of a limited company may also act as the vendor of the target assets in an asset 
transaction. 
The investor must inquire whether the target company is “state-owned”. If it is 
the case, he should discuss the proposed acquisition with the State Asset 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)12) to determine the value of 
the assets or of the equity to be acquired. The State-owned Asset Valuation Administrative 
Procedures 1991 and the Regulations on Several Issues on the Valuation and 
Administration of State-owned Assets 2002 are two pieces of law of general appli-
cation when evaluating ‘State-owned assets’ including enterprises and units. In par-
ticular the State-owned Asset Valuation Administrative Procedures 1991 require a 
‘unit occupying State-owned assets’ to carry out a valuation if: (i) it auctions or 
transfers its assets; (ii) it undergoes a merger or sale, enters into a cooperative 
arrangement, or operates as a company limited by shares; (iii) it forms an equity 
or cooperative joint venture with a foreign company; (iv) it undergoes liquidation; 
or (v) on the occurrence of any other event, it is required by law to carry out a 
valuation. On the other hand the Regulations on Several Issues on the Valuation 
12) In 2003, the PRC Government decided to strengthen the regulatory regime governing 
state-owned asset by creating the SASAC, namely the State-owned Assets Supervision 
& Administration Commission, a commission directly under the State Council, which 
is charged with the responsibility of supervising the assets of State-owned enterprises 
at the national level directly subordinate to the Party Central Commission.
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and Administration of State-owned Assets 2002 expanded the range of transactions 
for which an enterprise is required to carry out a valuation. They include: (i) a whole 
or partial conversion of the enterprise into a limited liability company or a com-
pany limited by shares; (ii) the use of non-currency assets for foreign investment; 
(iii) a merger, division, or liquidation of the enterprise; (iv) a change in the equity 
percentages of the original shareholders, (v) a transfer of all or part of its prop-
erty rights or equity interests; (vi) a transfer, exchange, or auction of its assets; 
(vii) a lease of all or part of its assets to a non State-owned unit; (viii) confirm-
ing the value of assets that are the subject of litigation; and (ix) any other trans-
action for which valuation is legally required (in this sense Art. 3). 
In an equity or asset acquisition, the seller and the buyer must use a valuation 
conducted by a properly established asset appraiser in the PRC as the basis for 
agreeing the transaction price.13) The valuation must be done in accordance with 
commonly accepted international methods of valuation. The valuation result should 
be used as a reference for the parties to agree on a price but, where the actual 
transaction price is less than the valuation by a margin of 10% or more, the party 
subject to the valuation must explain the difference in writing to the appropriate 
level finance bureau.14) If the price is less than 90% of the valuation, the trans-
action cannot proceed without the approval of the authority responsible for ap-
proving the transaction.15) It is noteworthy, valuations are valid for a period of 
one year from the valuation date.16) Under valuation has been deemed a serious 
offense as siphoning and injuring the state assets, which might affect and impede 
the M&A plan. 
13) Art. 14, M&A Regulations 2006.
14) Art. 12, Regulations on Several Issues on the Valuation and Administration of State-owned 
Assets 2002.
15) Art. 22, Interim Administrative Procedures on the Valuation of State-owned Assets of 
Enterprises 2005; Art. 13 Interim Procedures on the Administration of Transfers of 
Enterprises state-owned Property Rights 2004. 
16) Art. 21, Interim Administrative Procedures on the Valuation of State-owned Assets of 
Enterprises 2005.
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VI. Takeover of Listed Companies
Foreign companies wishing to enter the Chinese market can opt for the takeover 
of a listed company. Along with other laws and regulations mentioned before, the 
Measures for regulating Takeovers of Listed Companies (better known as “Takeovers 
Code”)17) sets up the most comprehensive legal framework for takeovers of 
Chinese listed companies. The Takeovers Code represents the continued efforts of 
the Chinese government to develop a modernized regulatory system for takeovers. 
The ongoing revisions are to suit and facilitate the new environment whereby the 
national economy is facing strategic restructuring. 
Chinese companies may be listed on one of China’s two national stock ex-
changes, namely, Shanghai,18) and Shenzhen,19) (Hong Kong is considered a market 
apart), and there are several different types of shares,20) distinguished by rules 
governing their ownership and trading. It must be stressed that the acquisition of 
17) Measure for regulating Takeovers of Listed Companies, promulgated by the China 
Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), 31
st
 July, 2006, and effective from 1
st 
September, 2006, and amended in 2008.
18) In 1946, Shanghai Securities Exchange was created on the basis of Chinese Security 
Exchange, but it ceased operations in 1949 when the communists took over China. 
With the development of socialist market economy under Chairman Deng Xiaoping’s 
opening up policy in the 1980s, treasury bonds and stocks gradually resumed trading. 
On November 26, 1990, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was established and it started 
operation on December 19, 1990. After several years’ operation, SSE had become the 
most prominent stock market in China. SSE is a membership institution directly 
governed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Further information 
about Shanghai Stock Exchange available at: http://chinastockventure.com/2009/12/shanghai- 
stock-exchange/
19) Shenzhen Stock Exchange (the SSE) was established in 1990, governed by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
20) The two exchanges in mainland China classify the stocks into A-share and B-share. 
Foreign investors take an active part in mainland China stock markets as QFIIs 
(Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors). In 2003, China permitted qualified foreign 
institutional investors to invest in listed domestic securities denominated in local 
currency, subject to a quota approved by The State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE), China’s foreign exchange controller. It must be noted that the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange classifies the Hong Kong shares with mainland China background 
into H-share and Red Chip, for its derivatives market.
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the shares of a Chinese listed company does not always lead to a change of con-
trol, in fact foreign investment in listed companies has traditionally taken the form 
of a negotiated minority stakes for the purpose of developing a strategic relation-
ship rather than seeking operating control. Depending on the share classification, 
21) foreign investors may acquire shares through a negotiated acquisition, a private 
placement, an open market acquisition or a block trade transaction. As it will be 
discussed later on, different rules and restrictions apply to each class of shares, 
and each class has different ownership and transfer procedures. Valuations (in par-
ticular by SASAC if state owned assets or SOEs are involved) are required for 
most negotiated acquisitions and statutory lockups are applicable to many types of 
acquisition.
Starting from February 2001, China permitted domestic individual residents to 
open B shares accounts with legally-obtained foreign currency and trade in B 
shares. With other forms of stocks flourishing, the importance of B shares de-
21) There are two main classes of domestically listed shares: A shares and B shares: A 
shares are basically limited to domestic investors, including individuals, legal persons, 
and the state, both denominated and treated in the local currency, i.e. the Chinese 
Yuan (RMB). Historically speaking, A shares were further sub-divided into three 
sub-sets in light of the strictly defined groups of shareholders, namely: i) state shares 
(guoyou gu, 国有股), ii) legal person shares (faren gu, 法人股), and iii) public shares 
(shehui gongzhong gu, 社会公众股). Only public shares used to be freely traded on 
the stock exchange, and therefore were called “tradable shares”, while state shares and 
legal person shares were subject to severe trading restrictions, and therefore collectively 
called “non-tradable shares”. In the past five years, the Chinese government has 
completed a substantial shareholding structure reform program pursuant to which the 
former non-tradable shares (including those held by foreign parties) gradually becoming 
converted at a certain discount into tradable shares that shall be freely traded on the 
stock exchange at the expiration of statutory lock-up periods. 
Listed domestically, B shares are denominated in Chinese Yuan (RMB) but subscribed 
to and traded in US dollars (for those listed in Shanghai) or Hong Kong dollars (for 
those listed in Shenzhen). B shares had emerged against the shortage of foreign currency 
and tight foreign exchange control in the early 1990s and were originally available 
only to overseas investors. B shares were introduced to allow foreign (and HK, Macau, 
Taiwan) investors to participate upon their requests amid the open-up policy, to gain 
experience from western countries, and to prevent sophisticated foreign investors to 
exploit the inexperienced Chinese counterparts. (In November 1991, Shanghai Vacuum 
Electronic Devices Company Limited was the first Chinese company to issue B shares). 
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clined, and trading volume and market capitalization shrank.22)
Now, as the economic reform proceeds, the Chinese government has been mak-
ing great efforts to gradually solve the problem of market segmentation, with a view 
to bring the market more in line with international norms and standards. Therefore, 
control transactions are now becoming more technically feasible. As will be dis-
cussed later, there are two main methods of takeovers in China: 1) takeover by 
public tender offer, which is used for tradable shares, and 2) takeover initiated by 
privately negotiated agreement, which was the common practice in the era of 
non-tradable shares. (CSRC approval in one form or another is required in both 
cases). 
VII. Features of the New “Takeover Regime in China” and 
Content of the Takeover Code
Since the new Securities Law and Company Law took effect in China in 2006, 
international fluid capital has begun to shift investment from the field of fixed as-
sets to stock acquisitions, private equity as well as enterprise realignment and 
mergers. Both these two pieces of legislation have contributed in shaping the pres-
ent framework governing takeovers of listed companies. The Securities Law has 
introduced a new takeover regime which was refined by the new Takeovers Code. 
Therefore, the Takeovers Code has greatly completed China’s takeover legal re-
gime and is now constituting a sound basis for takeover activities.23) The takeover 
22) Li Guo, in Chinese Business Law (edited by Bu, Ch. 4 Securities), C. H. Beck Hart 
(Germany & UK), p. 87 (2010). 
23) The other sources of law which may be relevant to takeover transactions are the mentioned 
Company Law which contains some provisions about merger and acquisitions, and in 
addition, the listing rules of the stock exchanges must also be consulted when 
conducting takeovers of listed companies as the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Share 
Listing Rules, promulgated 1998, amended 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2006. As to 
takeovers of listed companies by foreigners, there is a separate group of regulations 
in addition to those for domestic acquirers. These regulations impose limits on the 
access of foreigners to the domestic market, but if access is granted, foreigners will 
The Legal Considerations of Doing M&A with Chinese Companies / Guo, Li & Rizzi, Cristiano   263
of listed companies shall be conducted in line with the principles of openness, 
fairness and equity.24)  
Control acquisitions are subject to special regulations and may trigger tender of-
fer obligations. The dispositions of the Takeovers Code are applicable to acquis-
itions of over 30% of the outstanding shares of a listed company. In accordance 
with this equality of opportunity principle, a mandatory bid rule sits also at the heart 
of another China’s takeover law, namely the Securities law. In fact, art. 88 of the 
Securities Law states that Where an investor holds or holds with any other person 
30% of the stocks as issued by a listed company by means of agreement or any 
other arrangement through securities trading at a stock exchange and if the pur-
chase is continued, he shall issue a tender offer to all the shareholders of the said 
listed company to purchase all of or part of the shares of the listed company. 
Before analyzing in detail both the “mandatory bid rule” and the “tender offer” 
rules it is necessary to underline that the Takeovers Code puts an emphasis on 
takeovers by “tender offers”. Takeover by tender offer should now be seen as the 
main way to acquire shares in listed companies with a view to gaining corporate 
control of a target company. However, takeover by private agreement remains also 
a common method of gaining control of the target company. It is worth to note 
that, the Takeovers Code strengthens the regulations that prevent opportunistic 
takeovers, for instance, art. 6 states that an investor is barred from taking over 
any listed company if it has certain problems. In particular it is stated that an 
investor may not damage the legitimate rights and interests of a target listed 
company and its shareholders by taking advantage of the takeover of the listed 
company. A listed company may not be taken over under any of the following 
circumstances: (i) The purchaser owes a large amount of debts, and has not paid 
off its due debts, and the said circumstance is in a continuous state; (ii) The 
purchaser has ever committed any major illegal act or has ever been suspected of 
being involved in any major illegal act during the past 3 years; (iii) The purchaser 
has ever committed any serious credit-breaking act in the securities market during 
comply with basically the same takeover laws as Chinese nationals.
24) In this sense, Takeovers Code, art. 3.
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the past 3 years; (iv) The purchaser, be it a natural person, is under any of the 
circumstances as prescribed in Article 147 of the Company Law; or (v) Any other 
circumstance as prescribed by laws or administrative regulations or as recognized 
by the CSRC under which no listed company can be taken over.25) Furthermore, 
when making a takeover bid to be paid in cash, the bidder must deposit no less 
than 20% of the total amount of the offered price in the bank designated by the 
securities depository and clearing institution as the performance guarantee.26) 
1. Mandatory Bid Rule
Once the 30% threshold is reached, any further acquisition must be made by 
general or partial tender offer.27) Although the CSRC will continue to grant ex-
emptions on a case by case basis, the new Takeovers Code sets a more stringent 
regime, its rules and dispositions are more detailed, so to obtain exemption is 
more difficult. An acquirer can also agree to takeover a company by agreement 
with the company’s shareholders (known as negotiated takeovers or “Takeover by 
Agreement”, regulated in Chapter IV of the Takeover Code). However, once the 
acquirer acquires 30% of the issued shares of the target company and it continues 
to acquire shares, it must make a general offer for all (or part) of the company’s 
issued shares unless the CSRC grants a waiver from making an offer.28) The take-
over rules also apply to indirect acquisition (see Chapter V of the Takeover Code, 
“Indirect Takeovers”),29) i.e. where the acquirer has acquired an interest in an in-
termediate company that holds at least 30% of the issued shares of the listed 
company. This for example, can occur if a person acquires control of a control-
ling shareholder. In such a case, a general offer is required to be made. The mini-
25) Art. 6, Takeovers Code.
26) Art. 36, Takeovers Code.
27) Art. 47, Takeovers Code.
28) See arts. 94 to 96 of the Securities Law, and art. 47 of the Takeovers Code.
29) The term “indirect takeovers” refers to the situation where although an investor does 
not itself take over a listed company by directly acquiring its shares, the investor 
gains the control of the listed company by other means such as private agreement, 
investment relationship or any other arrangement, see Art. 56 of the Takeovers Code.
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mum partial tender offer is for 5% of the outstanding shares.30) Prior to 2006, a 
general tender offer for all shares was required upon reaching the 30% threshold.  
Through the indirect takeover model and without obtaining a waiver from the 
CSRC, Nanjing Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. in 2003 was the first Chinese listed com-
pany which faced the mandatory bid. In China, the obligation to make mandatory 
bids can be exempted by the CSRC. The Takeover Code has paid considerable at-
tention to this issue, clarifying the grounds upon which the CSRC may grant an 
exemption.31) In the past A share restrictions precluded foreign parties from mak-
ing tender offers, but it is necessary to stress again, the recent regulatory changes, 
which opened the A share market to foreign investors, make foreign participation 
in tender offers feasible. The take-over regulations now also permit the use of 
non-cash consideration32) (i.e. share swap, which will be treated later), allowing 
the use of equity consideration and more complex structuring arrangements in 
such a tender offer, although cash consideration must always be made available as 
an option. In order to improve the efficiency of the system, the CSRC sets out two 
application processes. More specifically, in some cases where the matter is com-
plicated, the application needs to go through a formal process;33) in other cases 
where crossing the 30% threshold appears to be technically caused by non-takeover 
activities such as inheritance or underwriting arrangements, a simplified procedure 
is to be followed to allow quicker processing.34) It is necessary to highlight that 
under Article 62 of the Takeover Code, apart from the CSRC, the shareholders of 
the target company can also pass a resolution to exempt the acquirer from the 
30) Significant disclosure and reporting requirements attach to holding a 5% interest in a 
listed company. The reporting requirements, however, have been simplified compared 
with the prior reporting requirements.
31) See Takeovers Code, arts 61 and 62. For example, exemptions may be granted if the 
acquirer and the transferor can prove that the transfer has not caused the change of 
the factual controller of the listed company.
32) Cash or shares can be used as consideration and the duration of the tender offer is 
subject to time limitation. A registered financial advisor must be engaged to review 
the transaction from a legal and business perspective.
33) Art. 62, Takeovers Code.
34) Art. 63, Takeovers Code.
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mandatory bid rule in certain cases.35) There is also a newly introduced exemption 
under which an investor can increase its shareholding by less than two (2)% in a 
rolling period of twelve (12) month.36)
2. Tender Offer Rules
In conformity with the fairness and openness principles, see in particular art 26,37) 
the Takeovers Code sets out detailed provisions on how to conduct a takeover bid 
(Chapter III and IV of the Takeovers Code). With the introduction of this new 
takeover regime, partial bids are also permitted (see the combined dispositions of 
arts. 23, 24, 25, 43, 47, and 56 of the Takeovers Code). The partial offer allows 
to gradually increment the control in a listed company, without the obligation to 
launch a tender offer on the rest of the capital until the investor reaches the 30% 
(if a waiver is not granted), granting to the investor a great flexibility. However, 
it must be stressed that under Article 43 (Takeovers Code), if the bidder in a par-
tial bid receives acceptances for a greater number of shares than specified in the 
offer, each acceptance shall be pro-rata basis (ex art. 88, Securities Law; and art. 
43, Takeovers Code) and the excess returned to target shareholders. In any case, it 
should be noted, that although proportional bids can ensure achievement of equal-
ity of opportunities among target shareholders, they shift to bidders the uncertainty 
as to the number of shares ultimately sold.38) Then, it is easy to imagine that if 
35) Art. 62 (2) and (3), Takeovers Code.
36) Art. 63 (2) of the Takeovers Code states in fact: …“In the case the shares of which 
the entitlements are held by the investor in a listed company reach or exceed 30% of 
the issued shares of the company, the shares of which the entitlements in the company 
are held by the investor as increased during every 12 months may not, within one 
year as of the occurrence of the aforesaid fact, exceed 2% of the issued shares of 
the company;”
37) Art. 26 of the Takeovers Code requires that in a takeover bid, all the shareholders of 
the target company be treated equally and fairly: “In case a listed company is taken 
over by means of tender offer, the purchaser shall equally treat all the shareholders 
of the company under takeover. And all the shareholders that hold the same kind of 
shares shall be treated equally”.
38) It would be unusual for all target shareholders to accept a proportional bid, therefore 
a bidder must pitch a proportional bid at such level as it estimates will take into 
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there are more acceptances than expected, the investor may have to acquire more 
shares and spend more than is necessary to gain corporate control.
Another point to be stressed is that the price offered under a takeover bid must 
not be less than the maximum price that the bidder has paid for the bid security 
during the six months preceding the date of the bid.39) In particular article 35 
states that if the offer price is below the arithmetic average value of the daily 
weighted average prices during the thirty trading days prior to the date of the bid, 
a financial consultant must be hired by the bidder to produce a report on issues 
such as whether there is any manipulation of stock prices, whether the bidder has 
failed to disclose its concerned parties, whether there is any other arrangement for 
the bidder to obtain the shares of the target company during the previous 6 
months, and finally whether the offer price is “rational” (…as well as the ration-
ality of the price offer price. Art. 35, Takeovers Code).
The Takeovers Code has also established another set of rules to ensure that the 
takeover bid will be conducted in accordance with the principle of equal oppor-
tunity previous mentioned and expressed in art. 26, which provides that all share-
holders should be treated equally in takeovers. In fact, this fundamental norm is 
reinforced by a prohibition against giving of collateral benefits during the bid. 
Namely, art. 38 (Takeovers Code) states that “in the case of tender offer, the pur-
chaser may not, after the announcement is made and before the takeover terms 
expires, sell any share of the company under takeover, nor may it buy any share 
of the company under takeover by any other means that hasn’t been stipulated in 
the tender offer or that goes beyond the conditions as stipulated in the tender of-
fer”. Then, the principle of openness is also embodied in the information dis-
closure regime (Chapter II of the Takeovers Code, “Entitlement Disclosure”, and 
also art. 29: information to be contained in the tender offer report). These rules 
provide a safeguard for target shareholders to prevent coercive tender offers through 
adequate information disclosure about the tender offer and the right to have rea-
account non-acceptances in order to attain the shareholding it wants to acquire. If 
there are more acceptances than expected, the bidder may have to acquire more 
shares and spend more than is necessary to gain corporate control.
39) In this sense, art. 35, Takeovers Code.
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sonable time to consider it. For example, the bidder must inform the market of 
the terms of the offer,40) and the offer should be open for a minimum time to 
avoid shareholders making a hasty decision.41) It must be stressed, if the bidder 
wants to change and vary the terms of the offer, the approval of the CSRC is re-
quired,42) and variation cannot occur within 15 days prior to the expiration of the 
bid unless a competing bid is made.43) Moreover, the target’s shareholders can 
withdraw their acceptance within 3 days before the expiration of the bid.44) 
In order to ensure equal treatment of all target shareholders, the China’s take-
overs regime pays particular attention to minority shareholders after takeover: if 
the tender offer expires and the acquirer has enough shares, usually 75% (90% 
when the total capital of the listed company exceeds 400 million yuan) of all out-
standing shares, to cause the de-listing of the target company, the remaining 
shareholders have the right to enforce the sale of their shares on the same terms 
as those in the offer. In this sense art. 97, Securities Law, and art. 44, Takeovers 
Code. According to the listing requirement, a listed company must meet a number 
of criteria, one of which is that the publicly held shares in a company must ac-
count for more than 25% of all outstanding shares, and if the total amount of the 
issued capital of the company exceeds 400 million yuan, then the publicly held 
shares must be more than 10%, in this sense, art. 50, Securities Law. 
However, there is a clear loophole from the acquirer’s perspective. Unlike many 
other foreign countries, the squeeze-out right is not stipulated in Chinese Securities 
Law, therefore the tender offeror can’t force out with ease the held-up shareholders 
even after getting 90% or more of all the total shares. In practice, in order to 
wipe out those remaining shareholders, a troublesome and controversial cash-out 
merger has to be employed following the cash or share tender offer.
40) Article 29 of the Takeovers Code requires the bidder to disclose relevant issue such 
as the purpose of the takeover, the offer price, and the payment arrangements.
41) Article 37 of the Takeovers Code stipulates that the effective period of the offer must 
be no less than thirty days and no more than sixty days, except where there is a 
contested offer.
42) In this sense art. 39, Takeovers Code.
43) In this sense art. 40, Takeovers Code.
44) In this sense art. 42, Takeovers Code.
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VIII. Takeover Defenses 
Under Article 67 of the Securities Law, if a ‘major event’ occurs which may 
impact the trading price of the company’s shares and which is not known to the 
investors, the listed company shall report such event to the CSRC and to the 
Stock Exchange, and announce the same.45)
 
A special takeover committee is es-
tablished by the CSRC to assist in dealing with the transaction, the committee 
provides consultation opinions on whether or not the takeover of a listed company 
is constituted, whether or not there is any circumstance under which a listed com-
pany may not be taken over, as well as other related matters.46)
Once the bid is announced, the target’s ability to engage in frustrating action is 
constrained (art. 33 of the Takeovers Code). The Takeover Code further requires 
that any defenses adopted by the board of directors must be in the interests of the 
company and the shareholders, and the board may not abuse its powers by im-
properly obstructing the takeover. Generally, the directors have to remain in a 
neutral position and they don’t have the right to jeopardize the bid by making 
acts of extraordinary administration just to create obstacles. Article 8 of the 
Takeovers Code provides that when taking defensive measures, target directors 
must meet their fiduciary duties owed to their company and that the defensive 
measures should be beneficial to the target company and shareholders and must 
not pose an inappropriate obstacle to the attempted takeover. 
The board is required to investigate the bidder and report to the CRSC within 
20 days after the bid is announced. In particular “the board of directors of the 
company under takeover shall make investigation into the capacity, credit status 
and purpose of takeover of the purchaser, analyze the conditions for tender offer, 
bring forward suggestions on whether or not the shareholders should accept the 
tender offer, and employ an independent financial consultant to issue professional 
45) Art. 67 (8) states that the target company shall make this report when “a considerable 
change in the holdings of shareholders or actual controllers who each hold or control 
no less than 5% of the company’s shares”.
46) In this sense, Art. 10, Takeovers Code.
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opinions”, moreover, “in case the purchaser makes any major alteration to the 
conditions for tender offer, the board of directors of the company under takeover 
shall, within 3 working days, submit the supplementary opinions of the board of 
directors and of the independent financial consultant on the alteration of conditions 
for tender offer, and give a report and make an announcement”.47) This report is 
likely to be influential, and obtaining CSRC approval may be more difficult if the 
takeover is hostile.
Under Article 33 of the Takeovers Code, after the bidder announces its offer, 
the target may not dispose of assets, undertake external investment, change the 
company’s principal business or change any security arrangements for loans if 
such actions would materially affect the company’s assets, liabilities, rights and in-
terests or results of operations, unless the shareholders’ general meeting approves. 
These transactions will usually have a significant effect on the company’s finan-
cial condition and business performance thus influencing the price of the shares at 
the stock exchange. 
These restrictions do not apply to carrying on normal business activities or en-
forcing the resolutions of the shareholders’ general meeting, although they would 
rule out the possibility of issuing shares or disposing of crown jewels to the preferred 
bidder in order to frustrate a hostile bid, unless such action is approved by the 
shareholders’ general meeting. In other words, there could be some provisions 
with the effect of anti-takeover preloaded in the company’s article of association 
if adopted by the shareholders’ general meeting. It has become even more feasible 
when the amended Company Law which took effective on 1
st
 Jan., 2006, granted 
more autonomy towards the article of association. In the 1998 case of Shanghai 
Ace, a provision for the staggered board was considered to be against the compul-
sory Company Law format and deemed invalid. But within the new Company 
Law regime, things such as staggered board, gold parachute, voting rights restriction, 
and super-majority vote, etc., have been added into some listed companies’ article 
of association. It should be noted that such provisions are still uncommon in gen-
eral and have not yet been contested in court, largely due to the fact that the hos-
47) In this sense Art. 32, Takeovers Code.
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tile takeover is rare in China.
In bringing about a takeover of a listed company, a party cannot engage in 
“prohibited trading activities” as defined in the Securities Law 2006.48) Generally 
speaking, these “prohibited trading activities” are essentially the equivalents of in-
sider dealing49) and market manipulation activities.50) Certain persons are consid-
ered to be “informed person with insider information on securities trading” (see 
arts. 74 and 76, Securities Law), they include: (i) directors, supervisors, and senior 
officers; (ii) companies in which the company has a controlling interest and their 
directors, supervisors, and senior officers; (iii) persons who have access to insider 
information of a company by virtue of the positions they hold; and (iv) a de facto 
controlling shareholder and its directors, supervisors, and senior officers. (Also in-
cluded are shareholders who hold at least 5% of the shares of the company and 
their directors, supervisors, and senior officers even though a 5% shareholder may 
not necessarily in fact have access to insider information). The basic prohibition is 
that “informed persons” with insider information,51) on securities trading and per-
sons who have unlawfully obtained insider information are prohibited from: (i) us-
ing such information to trade in securities; (ii) disclosing such information; or (iii) 
making recommendations to third parties to buy or sell securities.52) One important 
ambiguity here is whether the focus should be on the possession of such in-
formation itself (knowing) or the informed persons should also act due to such in-
48) See Section IV of the Securities Law. Article 73 in particular states that: Any insider 
who has access to any insider information of securities trading or who has unlawfully 
obtained any insider information is prohibited from taking advantage of the insider 
information as held thereby to engage in any securities trading.
49) This expression means dealing with “insider information” which is information concerning 
the company to be acquired which has not been disclosed and which may have a 
major effect on the market price of the company’s shares, the Securities Law sets out 
various examples of information that could be considered to be “insider information”, 
see art. 75, Securities Law.
50) The Securities Law prohibits various types of activities that have the effect of manipulating 
the securities market and imposes civil, administrative and even criminal liabilities on 
the perpetrator, see art. 77, 203, and 231 of the Securities Law.
51) In this sense, Securities Law, art. 73.
52) In this sense, Securities Law, art. 76.
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formation (using). Art. 76 and art. 73 seem conflicting in this point, the first of 
which suggests a tougher stance against the insiders without carving out any ex-
ception for the dealings out of other reasons.
IX. Share Swaps : a Critical Development in M&A Transactions 
Share swaps represent a critical development in the M&A panorama. This not 
only represents a new form of payment for a target company, but also a newly 
allowed form of investment to establish a presence in China. Basically the shares 
of an existing company (or of a newly established company, namely the Special 
Purpose Vehicle or “SPV”)
 
are used as consideration for the shares of the target 
company. Except for SPVs, only companies listed on recognized stock exchanges 
may use equity for acquisition in China (arts. 28 and 29 of the M&A Regulations 
2006). In any case, approval from MOFCOM is required for all acquisitions in 
which equity is used as consideration (art. 32 of the M&A Regulations). 
The most straight forward means of acquiring an enterprise in China is to ac-
quire its off shore holding company. This does not typically require Chinese gov-
ernment approval, although approval might be needed if certain competition law 
reporting thresholds are met (see paragraph on Anti-monopoly review).
It is also worth noting that it is uncertain whether CSRC was only given the 
authority to approve all SPV companies’ offshore listing or only the listings of 
those that are limited to equity interest exchange transactions. This does not mean 
that the CSRC has no jurisdiction over the overseas listing of SPV upon its 
acquisition of a related domestic company via cash transaction. If CSRC’s juris-
diction over the said transaction under the M&A Regulations 2006 maybe un-
certain even though the presence of article 40,53) it seems more appropriate to af-
53) Art. 40, M&A Regulations 2006, states that: “Where a special purpose company to 
be listed overseas, the listing shall be proved by the security regulatory authority 
under the State Council. The country or region where the special purpose company is 
listed shall have a sound legal and regulatory system, and the securities regulatory 
authority of such country or region has concluded a memorandum of understanding 
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firm that the CSRC’s regulatory power over such case is granted by Article 238 
of the Securities Law.54) 
More precisely the SPV, which was not mentioned under the 2003 Interim 
Regulations, is defined under the 2006 Regulations as an overseas company di-
rectly or indirectly controlled by the PRC companies or PRC individuals for the 
purpose of consummating the listing in an overseas securities exchange of the 
shares in a PRC domestic company actually owned by the PRC companies or 
individuals. As an exception to general rule under Article 29 of the 2006 
Regulations, shareholders of the SPV may use unlisted shares in the SPV or new-
ly issued shares in the SPV as the consideration for the acquisition of shares in a 
domestic affiliate. If a PRC domestic company wants to set up a SPV, it must 
submit application documents to the Ministry of Commerce for approval, and once 
MOFCOM grants approval for the SPV, the shareholders shall go through the rel-
evant foreign exchange registration formalities with the local branch of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange. The listing of a SPV in an overseas ex-
change is subject to the approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). Prior to the submission of the listing application to CSRC, the related 
M&A transaction with share swaps must be approved by MOFCOM. The total 
value of the shares issued should not be lower than the value of the shares in the 
domestic enterprise under the share swap based on the appraisal report issued by 
a qualified PRC asset appraisal firm. Within 30 days of the completion of the 
overseas listing, the domestic company must report to MOFCOM regarding the 
overseas listing and the plan for the repatriation of the proceeds from the listing 
back into China.
Before the 2006 Rules, there was no explicit statutory guidance on using equity 
for acquisition in China, so applications to do so were generally rejected. Foreign 
on cooperation in regulation with the securities regulatory authority under the State 
Council, and has kept the effective relationship of cooperation in regulation.”
54) Article 238 of the Securities Law provides that “the direct or indirect share offering 
and listing of domestic enterprise shall get the approval of the securities regulatory 
authority of the State Council in accordance with relevant regulations of the State 
council.”.
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acquirers must engage a PRC registered M&A consultant, which will conduct a 
due diligence55) on the foreign shares and issue a consulting report for review and 
examination by the approval authorities, and an acquirer must pre-execute certain 
documents which would be used to roll-back the transaction and re-implement the 
original share structure of the domestic company if certain conditions–including 
the share swap- are not completed within a certain period of time.
X. A Review and Outlook of VIE (Variable Interest Entity): 
a Brief Introduction
In the past, many technology companies in China have done business through 
Variable Interest Entities (“VIE”) in order to gain access to foreign capital and to 
help expand their business. Recently, the dispute over the ownership of Alipay, a 
leading online payment service provider in China that decided to cancel all of 
their VIE agreements, has not only created debates about business ethics in China 
but more importantly has brought up questions as to why China’s regulatory au-
thorities are stepping up scrutiny of the VIE structure, the Pandora’s box behind 
the dispute.
55) An important step in the acquisition process, whether acquiring shares or assets, is 
thorough financial and legal due diligence. A due diligence is basically a formal legal 
and financial investigation to identify the correct assets and liabilities of a target 
company. Where the acquisition involves the purchase of an interest held by a 
foreign company, the due diligence process may be routine, but not always in China. 
The due diligence is still relatively a new process to SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) 
and other domestic PRC enterprises, and therefore problems may occur, this is the 
reason why it should be done by local Chinese, in fact they have the cultural and 
background knowledge needed to make this process the most efficient and smooth.
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1. Definition of VIE
The VIE (Variable Interest Entity) structure is a corporate structure which in-
cludes a series of contractual arrangements to enable foreign investors to obtain a 
degree of control over, as well as a substantial economic interest in Chinese com-
panies without having to directly own their shares, the above is a typical VIE 
structure.
2. Key Elements of VIE
(1) SPV
Under a VIE structure, domestic owners and foreign investors will jointly set up 
a SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) for the purpose of capital operation. Any finan-
cial arrangement or public offering can be realized on SPV level. 
(2) Operating entity
Operating entity is a company which has all necessary licenses to run its busi-
ness in China and more importantly, is the source of benefits and losses under a 
VIE structure. In most cases, domestic owners of operating entity are its founders. 
(3) WFOE
To build up connections with the operating entity and to avoid potential needs 
to deal with China’s government, the offshore SPV will set a wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise (WFOE) under PRC laws. A WFOE can sometimes also conduct a por-
tion of operating entity’s business in China.
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(4) Legal agreements
The concept that underpins VIE is that any control or economic benefit is ob-
tained through legal agreements rather than share ownership. From the accounting 
perspective, a SPV could consolidate the operating entity by using contractual ar-
rangements, the following agreements can be typically found under most VIE 
structures:
- Loan agreement : The domestic owners borrow funds from WFOE to capital-
ize the operating entity. This agreement usually forms the main underlying ob-
ligation for the following equity pledge agreement.
- Equity pledge agreement : The domestic owners pledge their shares in the op-
erating entity to the WFOE as collateral, to secure the full performance of do-
mestic owners’ obligation under loan agreement and other agreements. Under 
PRC laws, this agreement needs to be duly registered with relevant authority. 
- Call option agreement : With its discretion, the WFOE has the right to ac-
quire all the operating entity’s shares from the domestic owners, and the pay-
ment price can be offset against the loan provided by the WFOE. From a 
practical viewpoint, this option cannot be exercised until some point in the fu-
ture China’s regulatory authorities allow the foreign share ownership in the 
operating entity.
- Power of attorney : The domestic owners grant a power of attorney to the 
WFOE, which means the WFOE is justified to exercise all shareholder rights 
in the operating entity.
- Consulting service agreement : The operating entity agrees to use the WFOE 
as its service provider and pays it service fee. It is through this way that the 
WFOE transfers profits of the operating entity to itself, ultimately the SPV 
and all of its equity owners. 
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XI. Why China’s Regulatory Authorities are 
Challenging the VIE Structure?
Today, the VIE structure faces substantial uncertainty in China because regu-
latory authorities are challenging its legitimacy under PRC laws and regulations. 
Undoubtedly, an earthquake will be caused in the capital market if VIE agree-
ments are held invalid, since it is widely used in many offshore listed Chinese 
companies, especially in the internet sector. The question presents itself: Why does 
it appear that China’s regulatory authorities are re-examining and changing their 
attitudes toward VIE structures? The answer can be found by looking into the his-
tory of VIE in China.
Dating back to 2000, the VIE structure first became known to the public in 
Sina’s IPO, which is why the VIE structure is also commonly referred to as the 
“Sina model”. At this time the VIE structure was a popular alternative to certain 
businesses for the following reasons: 
1. Systematical obstacles … like harsh IPO rules and lack of venture capital …
prevented private sectors … especially emerging industries from raising money 
in China’s capital market. 
2. Sector-oriented regulation limited foreign investment in certain sectors. Ideally, 
if the operating entity could be a WFOE then the complex VIE is no longer 
needed (that’s why the call option agreement would exist), which, however, 
is not permitted because the operating entity belongs to a prohibited sector.56) 
Generally speaking, foreign investment is classified into three levels accord-
ing to different sectors, “encouraged”, “restricted”, and “prohibited” … for some 
sectors, the foreign ownership of equity is either completely prohibited or restricted 
to a small proportion after an unpredictably long time approval process. 
56) Take Sina as an example, in China, ICP (Internet Content Provider) license will only 
be chartered to a domestically funded company. However, this license is indispensable 
for an internet company which holds a portal website as its core asset like Sina. 
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Under these circumstances, VIE provided an alternative solution for capital-hungry 
entrepreneurs and eager foreign investors, especially venture capitals and private 
equity funds, which hold great capital for economic return. 
Obviously China’s government was aware of VIE, because many large and famous 
companies used this corporate structure. And if the Chinese government wanted, 
they could have shut it down which by process of negation means that while VIE 
structure might not have been a preferred investment vehicle it was accepted. 
During that period of time : 1. Regulatory authorities had realized that small en-
terprises in the internet sector needed capital but they couldn’t get it onshore be-
cause of systematical obstacles and sector-oriented regulation, as discussed above; 
2. The internet sector did not cause too much concern for regulatory authorities. 
As a result, they tacitly accepted the use of VIE structure in the internet sector.
In several years after Sina’s IPO, more companies like Sohu, Xiecheng, Tecent 
and Baidu, most in the internet sector, have accomplished offshore financing and 
listing through the VIE structure. All these companies were successful and their 
success further justified the use of the VIE structure.
To conclude, VIE was just a product of time, a technical method that provides 
regulatory authorities an “excuse” to naturally accept internet enterprises’ offshore 
financing and listing … on which regulatory authorities do not have any material 
disagreement no matter if the VIE exists or not … without amending laws or 
regulations. Moreover, since VIE is still an arguable issue, this unfinished con-
troversy gives regulatory authorities more leverage in regulating these companies. 
Now, it is time to use that leverage. For the following reasons, China’s regu-
latory authorities are now taking steps against VIE structure:
1. National Security Concern
Compared to the first several years of 21
st
 century, time has changed. Unlike 
ten years ago, internet regulation now becomes a politically sensitive and national 
security-related issue for China’s government, and the fact that almost every influ-
ential internet company is controlled by foreign investors through the VIE struc-
ture makes regulatory authorities deeply insecure.
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2. Public Policy Concern
Regulatory authorities cannot tolerate VIE becomes a manipulated tool that 
helps companies transfer their assets and profits offshore and even deliberately 
circumvent PRC laws and regulations. VIE started in the internet sector, than 
moved to other sectors like media (Focus Media, IPO in 2005) and education 
(New Oriental, IPO in 2006). However, the use of VIE seems has gone beyond 
control from then on. In 2009, China Qinfa went public in Hongkong with a VIE 
structure, which outraged regulatory authorities: 1. Unlike those emerging light-asset 
companies, Qinfa is a traditional heavy-asset company which engages in coal 
operation business; 2. Qinfa circumvented Chinese M&A rules,57) foreign currency 
exchange regulations and industry-admission policy. This shows, as mentioned 
above, while VIE serves as a comfortable “excuse” for regulatory authorities to 
acquiesce the offshore financing and listing of emerging light-asset companies, it 
doesn’t mean that VIE is acceptable in any other sector, especially those 
traditional heavy-asset industries like Qinfa. 
3. Systematical Obstacles Disappear
The growth of China’s capital market has been remarkable over the past decade. 
On the one hand, VC/PE industry has boomed in recent years and private sectors 
now have diverse channels to raise capital onshore, from early-stage venture capi-
tal to ultimate public offering. On the other hand, Shenzhen Stock Exchange has 
set up ChiNext in 2009, where qualified small and growing enterprises’ shares can 
be publicly traded. Rules of listing on ChiNext are more flexible than traditional 
IPO rules and moreover, regulatory authorities encourage and support those lead-
ing companies in emerging industries to go listing in the A share market. 
However, despite all the dissatisfactions on VIE, China’s government is not 
likely to clear existing VIE structures in offshore listing companies in the near future 
because the government has to consider its reputation in the international com-
57) Provisions for the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, enacted 
in 2006.
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munity and other political factors. According to a report purportedly issued by the 
CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission)58) the use of VIE may have to 
be approved by regulatory authorities in the future and relevant legislation in this 
regard is already being pushed forward; however, those offshore listing companies 
which have used the VIE structure may be safe harbored.
XII. The New Merger Control Regime: 
an Introduction and Further Developments
The Anti-monopoly law (hereinafter indicated as AML), which went into effect 
at the beginning of August 2008,59) has added an additional level of complexity 
to acquisitions. The AML applies to both foreign and domestic parties. The new 
AML introduces the concept of concentration to describe transactions which may 
be subject to merger control. “Concentration” is defined in the AML as: (i) a merger 
between business operators; (ii) acquisition of control over other business operator 
by way of equity or asset acquisition; (iii) acquisition of control over other business 
operator or of the ability to wield a decisive influence over other business operator 
by way of contract or other means.60)
Anti-monopoly review has now become one of the most important and some-
times controversial process during MOFCOM review process. 
Basically the AML aims to protect fair competition and it targets three types of 
“monopolistic conduct” : (i) Anti-competitive “monopoly agreements”, (ii) Abuses 
of dominant market position, and (iii) Concentration that are “likely to eliminate 
or restrict competition.”
The AML also prohibits certain anti-competitive monopolistic agreements among 
58) See http://www.eeo.com.cn/2011/0928/212678.html, please note this report is not officially 
verified.
59) Anti-monopoly Law (AML), passed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on August 30, 2007, effective from August 1, 2008.
60) In this sense, art. 20 of the AML.
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multiple firms. Several types of horizontal agreements among competitors, such as 
price-fixing cartels and agreements to divide markets, and certain vertical agree-
ments limiting the prices at which purchasers may resell products to their down-
stream customers are expressly prohibited. 
The Anti-Monopoly Bureau,61) assisted by the Ministry of Commerce, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, and the National Development and 
Reform Commission, is in charge of market concentration review for foreign ac-
quisitions and investments. 
Generally, the acquisition of any interest in a Chinese company by a foreign in-
vestor requires the government’s approval and one critical issue is the approval 
level that is required. An approval from a local or provincial office of MOFCOM 
is typically sufficient for most transactions. However, certain types of acquisitions, 
such as those described below and those that involve a purchase price that ex-
ceeds a certain thresholds, require central government approval: (i) Investment in a 
company that holds a famous trademark or trade name; (ii) Investment in a crit-
ical industry or an important industry that potentially affects China’s economic se-
curity; (iii) Restructure of a Chinese company to a jurisdiction outside China; and 
(iv) Cross-border equity swap or share exchange.
1. Notification
Under the Anti-monopoly Law, within 30 days of the receipt of all documents 
necessary for a merger notification, the Anti-Monopoly Bureau should review 
the merger notification and issue a decision on whether to conduct an in-depth 
investigation.62) However, it does not mean that the 30-day period starts since 
then. It is very likely that the MOFCOM would find that the submitted documents 
are not detailed enough and thus would ask for more supplementary documents. In 
61) The Anti-monopoly Bureau is a subordinated department of MOFCOM and the latter 
is also the authority in charge of foreign investment approvals in China. When the 
Anti-monopoly Bureau carries out a merger review, it will be inevitably influenced by 
MOFCOM.
62) Art. 25, Anti-monopoly Law.
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this case, the 30-day period will start again once the required documents are 
submitted. Such rounds of supplementary document submission could occur many 
times in the process of anti-trust filing. If according to the decision of the 
Anti-Monopoly Bureau no in-depth investigation is necessary or if the Anti-Monopoly 
Bureau fails to make a decision within the above time limit, then clearance for 
the concentration shall be deemed to be given. If the Anti-Monopoly Bureau initiates 
an in-depth investigation, it will have an additional 90 days for the in-depth 
investigation. Under the circumstances contained in article 26 of the AML, Anti-Monopoly 
Bureau may extend such period for another 60 days.
If the Anti-Monopoly Bureau fails to complete their review and to issue their 
decision within the above time limits, the parties to the transaction may implement 
the concentration.
2. Thresholds for Reporting Concentrations
According to the Regulations on the thresholds for reporting concentration63) 
all combinations must apply to Authorities in charge of anti-monopoly review if: 
(i) the turnover in the aggregate achieved by all parties to the M&A transaction 
exceeds 10 billion yuan world-wide or 2 billion yuan in Mainland China; and/or 
(ii) the turnover achieved by at least two of them respectively exceed 400 million 
yuan in Mainland China. 
Merger notification to the Anti-Monopoly Bureau is mandatory if the transaction 
meets any of the notification thresholds.64) The transaction may not be consummated 
until the review is complete, and no transaction may be implemented before 
clearance. 
The MofCOM’s Anti-Monopoly Bureau has issued a series of guidelines: (i) 
Opinion on Guidance of Merger Review (“Guidelines for Merger Review”) 1 
January 2009; (ii) Opinion on Guidance of Notification of Concentration of 
63) Provision on the Notification Thresholds for Concentration of Business Operators, also 
known as the Regulations on the thresholds for reporting concentration were promulgated 
by the PRC State Council on 3 August 2008 and entered into force on the same day. 
64) In this sense, art. 21, Anti-monopoly Law, 2008.
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Business Operators, dated 5 January 2009; (iii) Opinion on Guidance of Notification 
Documents of Concentration of Business Operators, dated 7 January 2009, which 
give detailed technical requirements for merger filings, and also list the in-
formation that must be submitted, but they do not clearly specify a filing deadline 
and some concepts remain unclear (e.g. geographic market). However, there is still 
uncertainty though regarding a number of key issues relating to the application of 
the AML, including whether and how the Anti-Monopoly Bureau will apply the 
AML to joint ventures and how turnover should be calculated.
For many years China was a planned economy and competition against the state 
was a non-factor, however, as more aspects of a market economy began to take 
root in China the need to develop an anti-monopoly law became apparent to 
Chinese authorities. Even now, with new legal developments most SOEs still are 
not considered in such reviews of market competition because Chinese regulators 
have taken the position that their pricing and policy decisions are made by state 
directives rather than market principle. That is why these SOEs can be referred to 
as “administrative monopolies” because their market position is artificially created 
by government policies and protection. Through their policies Chinese authorities 
have split “administrative monopolies” into two main groups based on their im-
portance to state development and security. The first group is referred to as 
“strategic” industries in which the states should keep complete control. There are 
seven “strategic” industries : defense, electric generation and distribution, petro-
leum and petrochemicals, telecoms, coal, civil aviation and waterway transport. 
The second group has been dubbed “basic or pillar” industries in which the state 
should keep a strong influence. “Basic or pillar” industries include: machinery, au-
tomobiles, information technology, construction, steel, base metals and chemicals. 
While foreign businesses have invested in some of these industries their invest-
ments are limited to the point where they have no input or say over the direction 
of the SOE. This situation has caused concern to many foreign companies and or-
ganizations like the World Bank which have tried to persuade China to open up 
such sectors to market forces. In particular, they want China to limit its protection 
of certain industries and create the circumstances for a more level playing field so 
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private enterprises can enter those sectors. By doing so they are trying to con-
vince China that private enterprises can help the Chinese themselves by making 
those sectors more efficient. However, at the same time are hoping to make China 
more integrated with international market principles. With regards to China’s an-
ti-monopoly law there is a hope within many foreign groups that China’s regu-
latory regime will use their powers to break down certain “administrative monopo-
lies”.
Regardless of whether a transaction involves the purchase of assets rather than 
equity, on February 3, 2011, the General Office of the PRC State Council issued 
the Notice Regarding the Establishment of National Security Review Mechanism 
for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the 
“Notice” in force from March 5, 2011), which applies to both those types of 
transactions, and which renders the entire process of approval of the transaction 
more strict especially when are involved SOEs and National interests, thus National 
security. The Notice represents another major step that the Chinese government 
has taken in recent years in the area of regulating mergers and acquisitions of do-
mestic companies by foreign investors in China. The Notice sets up a minis-
try-level intra-agency joint meeting as the “national security review committee”.65) 
Two broad transaction types are subject to National Security review: (i) a non-Chinese 
investor’s “acquisition” of any stake (even a small one) in a military enterprise, a 
supplier to a military enterprise, a company located near sensitive military facili-
ties, or any other company relating to national defense; and (ii) a non-Chinese in-
vestor’s “acquisition” involving “control” of a Chinese company whose business 
involves “key” agricultural products, energy and resources, infrastructure, transportation 
65) The national security review committee will review, approve or block a transaction 
based on the following aspects: (i) influence on national defense security, including 
influence on domestic manufacturing capabilities, services and related facilities and 
equipment required by national defense; (ii) influence on national economic stability; 
(iii) influence on basic social order; and (iv) influence on China’s ability to research 
and develop key technologies for national security. The foreign investment security 
review committee will be guided by the State Council and led by the National 
Development and Reform Commission and MOFCOM, which will conduct reviews 
together with other agencies on as needed basis.
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services or technologies or manufacturing of equipment and machinery “affecting 
national security,”66) although the Notice does not provide guidance as to the meaning 
of “key” or “affecting national security.” Under the Notice, the term “de facto 
control ” refers to the following circumstances: (i) owning 50% or more of the 
equity of a company (including where multiple non-Chinese investors together 
own 50% or more of the company’s equity); (ii) having voting rights sufficient to 
exercise a major impact on resolutions of a shareholders’ meeting or board meet-
ing; or (iii) having decision-making authority over a company’s business, financial 
affairs, personnel or technology. 
XIII. Taxation framework for Enterprises Restructuring in China: 
a General Introduction
The new Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law) has a direct impact on M&A 
activity. The adjustment of tax rates, the reduction of fiscal incentives both have 
to be considered in structuring an M&A transaction. 
In an equity acquisition transaction, where the target entity is a domestic company, 
income earned will be treated as part of enterprise’s taxable income for enterprise 
income tax purpose. If the target company is a FIE, income will be subject to 
withholding tax at 10% rate.
In an asset acquisition transaction, any gains or losses on transfer of assets shall 
be included in the taxable income of the target company for enterprise income tax 
purposes. Business tax shall be levied on the sales of real properties and in-
tangible assets. 
However, in planning such a transaction it has also to be considered “The 
Circular on Several Issues Concerning the Enterprise Income Tax Treatment of 
Enterprise Reorganizations”(i.e. “Circular 59”), issued on 30 April 2009 and retro-
active from 1 January 2008. It outlines the tax treatment of equity transfers in 
66) Acquisition of financial institutions are expected to be covered by future rulemaking.
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connection with an enterprise reorganization; in other words Circular 59 creates a 
taxation framework for enterprise restructuring in China. 
The State Administration of Taxation (SAT), following uncertainty on how to 
implement “Circular 59”, published the Administrative Measures on Enterprise 
Income Tax for Enterprise Restructuring (SAT Public Notice No. 4, or “Notice 4”) 
which provides guidance on key elements of Circular 59. Noteworthy “Notice 4” 
may also retrospectively affect restructurings completed in the past two years.
Basically “Circular 59” imposes on a business restructuring either (a) general 
tax treatment, or (b) special tax treatment. The general principle for General treat-
ment is that the tax incentives enjoyed by parties before a restructuring cannot be 
inherited by the resulting entity, but with the following exceptions: (i) in a merger, 
only the surviving enterprise can continue to enjoy certain transition tax incentives 
provided by the EIT Law during the remainder of the EIT transition period; (ii) 
For certain projects that enjoy exemptions under the EIT Law, such as infrastructure, 
environmental protection, and energy saving projects, if the projects are transferred 
in the restructuring, the recipient may continue to enjoy them during the remain-
ing EIT exemption period.
Special treatment allows a party to defer payment of enterprise income tax if its 
restructuring satisfies the following conditions: (i) the restructuring has its motiva-
tion a reasonable commercial objective, and not the avoidance or deferral of tax 
payments; (ii) substantial change to legal or economic structure, namely in the case 
of share or asset acquisitions, at least 75% of the total assets or shares are trans-
ferred; (iii) there is no change to the “substantial” business for at least 12 consec-
utive months after the restructuring; (iv) at least 85% of the total consideration is 
in shares (i.e., “Non-cash transactions”- the legislator, it is evident, has specifically 
considered share swaps); (v) the major shareholder of the acquisition target must 
not transfer the “share consideration” it received for at least 12 consecutive months 
after the restructuring. 
Notice 4 clarifies that all parties involved in a restructuring must use the same 
tax treatment, and select the same tax year for filing. Furthermore, as highlighted 
above Circular 59 states that the shares of the acquiring enterprise and of its con-
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trolling enterprise can be used as consideration, Notice 4 defines a “controlling 
enterprise” as an enterprise that has received direct investment from the acquiring 
enterprise. 
Special rules for Cross-border restructurings are also contained in “Circular 59”. 
It allows Special treatment only for cross-border and asset acquisitions that satisfy 
all the general conditions, and which fall within any of the following four sit-
uations: (i) a non tax-resident enterprise transfer its shares in a tax resident enter-
prise to another non-resident enterprise it wholly owns. The transfer cannot change 
the withholding tax burden of the parties. The transferor must commit to the tax 
authorities, in writing, that it will not transfer the shares in the other non tax-resi-
dent enterprise within three years; (ii) A non tax-resident enterprise transfers its 
shares in a tax resident enterprise to another tax-resident enterprise it wholly owns; 
(iii) A tax-resident enterprise invests in a non tax-resident enterprise it wholly 
owns using assets or shares it owns; (iv) Other circumstances approved by the 
Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation.
XIV. Employees as an “asset” and a Key Factor 
for the Success of the M&A Transaction
Although acquiring a local enterprise may facilitate the establishment of a com-
pany’s presence in China, for the smooth business operation it is not only neces-
sary to retain the key Chinese personnel but also to become familiar with their 
way of thinking. Only by understanding the locals and their culture is it possible 
to develop your business in the most profitable way. The inability to integrate or-
ganizational cultures is generally acknowledged as a top source of post-deal failure 
and lost value. It is also necessary to stress that foreigners naturally expect to 
have a strong role in running target companies, but they should be aware that the 
Chinese management team has the experience and the contacts (guanxi) it needs 
to be successful here in China. 
Whether an M&A transaction is structured as an equity or an asset deal, the in-
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terests of the employees of the target company are usually involved. For a 
state-owned target enterprise, formal consultation with the employees on their set-
tlement arrangement is required by law, and the final settlement arrangement plan 
of the employees is subject to the discussion and adoption of the employee repre-
sentatives’ assembly. 
In an asset acquisition, employees employed in the business that is being sold 
are not automatically transferred with the business. Each employee must agree to 
transfer to the buyer’s employment. If an employee agrees to transfer, his employ-
ment with the seller will be terminated and he will be re-employed by the buyer. 
Because an employee cannot be compelled to transfer, there is a risk that some 
employees may defect and find alternative employment which may affect business 
operations in the short term. Whether an employee decides to transfer will depend 
on variety of personal and economic factors, including the relative attractiveness 
of the new terms offered by the buyer compared with either existing terms or to 
the benefits he would be entitled to if he is made redundant. There is no rule in 
the PRC that provides that employees are automatically transferred on the same 
terms and conditions under which they are employed. There is therefore potential 
for abuse in that transferring employees could be offered terms less favorable than 
their current terms.
If an employee does not agree to transfer, the seller can either continue to em-
ploy him, make him redundant,67) or terminate his employment on the ground that 
the ‘objective circumstances’ existing at the time he was employed no longer exis
t.68) The seller will be liable for certain statutory severance payments. Such pay-
67) The redundancies must be made in accordance with a statutory procedure. A 
redundancy scheme has to be prepared that includes the names of employees to be 
made redundant, the timing of redundancy, and compensation to be paid. The scheme 
together with the views of the employees or labor union have then to be submitted 
to the local labor bureau before the redundancies can be implemented, in this sense 
art. 27, Labor Law 1995, and art. 4, Reduction of Staff for Economic Reasons 
Regulations 1995. The buyer should therefore request to inspect these documents 
where the scale of redundancies is material.
68) On termination of employment, an employer is liable to compensate an employee whether 
the termination was mutually agreed; in this sense, art 5 of the Economic Compensation 
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ments have to be made even if the employee unreasonably refuses an offer of 
suitable alternative employment with the buyer.
In an equity acquisition, the employees of the target company remain as employees. 
In fact, there is no change in their status and there is likely to be more stability 
in the workforce. In the case of contract workers engaged through a services com-
pany, there is also no change in their status as they remain employed by the serv-
ices company that has seconded them to the target company. It is unlikely that 
there will be any disruption to this arrangement assuming the services company 
wishes to continue doing business with the new owners of the target company. As 
regarding social insurance obligations, in an equity deal, each group company will 
remain liable for social insurance payments.
XV. Conclusion
When China joined the WTO in 2001, it embarked on a journey that would 
have led it becoming the world’s second largest economy within a decade only. 
However, to sustain its growth and development China has to introduce some re-
forms to further open its market, has stressed by the Report by the World Bank. 
This opening should also include sectors that before were not considered so im-
portant, in particular investments now are encouraged in environmental protection 
and new renewable sources of energy. Foreign companies that have developed green 
technology now have an opportunity to increase their business activities if they 
are willing to invest in new environmental oriented projects in China. There is no 
doubt that in the near future foreign companies that have gained experience in 
this field and have developed technologies intended to improve the efficiency in 
using scarce resources for a sustainable green development, they will be at an ad-
for Breaches and Termination of Labor Contracts Procedures 2005. The employee is 
entitled to one month’s salary for each full year of employment up to a maximum of 
12 months. Where the employee has worked less than one year, he is entitled to 
compensation on the basis that he has worked for one year.
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vantage with regards to any M&A activities they wish to engage in China. 
Foreign companies all around the world are under pressure to establish, or rapidly 
expand their presence in Chinese market which has resulted immune to the recent 
international crisis, though its expansion is slowing down. However, any company 
wishing to do business in China should never forget the difficulties of doing busi-
ness there, in fact adapting the business to a vastly different culture and environ-
ment it is not an easy task.
M&A and Takeovers have recently developed into the preferred method to es-
tablish a presence in China. Though China has made considerable advances in the 
last several years in trying to develop a coherent and predicable regulatory frame-
work for M&A and Takeovers, its legal framework is extremely vast, complex, and 
fragmented. Therefore, in order to grow along with the Chinese market through 
these transactions it is necessary to hire a team of lawyer familiar with this framework 
able to suggest the right move, in fact without a disciplined acquisition process, it 
is easy to waste time, money and resources on chasing the wrong targets. 
China has made evident progress to bring its merger control regime more in 
line with prevailing international standards; however its Anti-monopoly Bureau 
needs to gain more independence and anti-trust expertise. In fact, it must be noted 
that the discretionary powers of the authorities in charge of reviewing proposed 
concentrations has increased and this could impede the realization of an M&A 
transaction. 
With positive economic outlook and with plenty of available targets and also 
with the introduction of the reforms auspicated by the World Bank, China will re-
main an attractive investment environment for a long time. However, a foreign in-
vestor that eagers to use these new instruments of investment must consider a ser-
ies of variables: it is not only necessary to understand the legal framework regu-
lating these transaction, but also necessary to find the correct target and to under-
stand the cultural and investment environment, otherwise it is better to reconsider 
an investment only after it is possible to master all these elements.
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